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Burma Banzai 
The Air War in Burma 
through Japanese Eyes 
Atholl Sutherland Brown and William Rodney 
The possibility of meeting Japanese pilots who flew in Burma during the Second World War 
occurred when the authors decided to attend the 
Commonwealth Aircrew Reunion, A Gathering 
of Eagles, scheduled to be held in Perth, 
Australia, 2-10 September 2000. Since Perth is, 
in effect, half way around the world we 
determined to continue the journey following the 
meetings and circumnavigate the globe, pausing 
en route in Burma (Myanmar). The decision to 
visit Burma in turn stemmed from Sutherland 
Brown's service there in WWII. It also prompted 
us to think it would be interesting as well as 
useful if we could meet Japanese aircrew who 
also flew in that theatre during the Burma 
campaign. As a consequence one of us wrote to 
the Military Attache at the Canadian Embassy 
in Tokyo, Captain S. Verran (N), citing who we 
were, listing our wartime service, our desire to 
meet Japanese counterparts, and asked if he 
could put us in touch with veteran organizations 
that could facilitate such an encounter. He 
responded immediately and suggested we 
contact Renichi Misawa, the President of the All 
Burma Veterans Association of Japan, as well 
as with a Japanese national in London, England, 
Masao Hirakubo, OBE, who had extensive 
contacts among ex-servicemen. Subsequent 
correspondence with them yielded additional 
names and addresses of possible contacts, and 
ultimately resulted in five pilots and Mr. Misawa, 
an anti-aircraft gunner with the 33rd Imperial 
Army at Imphal, agreeing to talk to us. 1 We 
eventually met on 28 August 2000 at 10:30 am 
at International House in Tokyo's Roppongi 
district. Mr. Munechika Ashiba, General 
Manager, at International House, very ably and 
enthusiastically acted as translator. 
Punctual despite one who had to travel for 
two hours by train, well turned out, six small 
wiry men - we both towered a head above them 
- met us that morning in a small conference 
room. They seemed to know one another, thus 
adding a touch of informality to the occasion. At 
75 years of age, Mr. Nagai was the youngest; at 
86, Mr. Ito was the oldest. Indeed, Nagai after 
the establishment of the Japanese Defence Force 
re-enlisted and trained on F-86 and Lockheed 
F-104 aircraft in the United States. From the 
outset they were friendly, outgoing and, it soon 
transpired, willing to answer our questions and 
comments directly, and despite the inevitable 
delays of translation, without hesitation or 
diffidence. Three understood English to varying 
degrees but seldom spoke the language. Before 
and fol lowing the meet ing we have had 
correspondence from some of them in English. 
As we knew, and the Japanese airmen 
reiterated, they served in the Army Air Force, 
which was essentially a tactical force geared 
primarily to the actions of their ground troops. 
All five of our respondents were fighter pilots 
who flew "Oscars" (the American code name for 
the Nakajima Ki.43 single seater of various 
marks), part of the Fifth Air Division in Burma. 2 
Ito and Yashuda both served with what Ito 
termed the great 64th Sentai (Squadron). 
Historical Background 
Burma emerged as a major operational arena following the succession of Allied defeats and 
retreats in late 1941 inflicted by Japanese forces 
bent on conquering India. They swept through 
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Malaya, Singapore, the East Indies and a non-
resistant Siam (Thailand) and into Burma by 
the beginning of March 1942. The topography, 
rivers, railways and locations of major airfields 
in Burma and its neighbours were significant 
factors in the campaign. At the onset of the 
monsoon in 1942 British and Indian units, 
blessed with little modern weaponry, withdrew 
with great difficulty across the Chin Hills in 
northern Burma into India where, during the 
ensuing stalemate, they and their allies gradually 
regrouped their forces. While the litany of 
disasters on land unfolded, the Royal Navy was 
fortunate to escape the attempt of a major 
Japanese task force to eliminate its capital ships 
and bases in Ceylon (Sri Lanka) in April 1942, 
a possibility which the British never envisaged 
and for which they were completely unprepared.3 
The build up for a return to Burma 
proceeded slowly for the South East Asia 
Command, isolated at the end of a long supply 
l ine, commanded the lowest priori ty for 
reinforcements and equipment. In addition, 
much of what was sent was not of the first order.4 
Meanwhile, the Japanese were not idle. Using 
prisoners of war as forced labour together with 
Tamils dragooned from the rubber plantations 
of Malay, they built a railway from Bangkok to 
Moulmein as a strategic overland supply route 
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to Burma to provide the means for a renewed 
assault upon India. 5 That attempt began in 
March 1944 during the dry season when the 
Japanese forces mounted two major attacks, a 
feint in the Arakan followed by a main thrust 
directed upon the Imphal area in the northern 
Chin Hills where mountains rise to 10,000 feet. 
For their part the Allies countered by 
launching an 
than the infamous Bang-kok railway could 
provide. The resultant defeat in Burma was the 
greatest suffered by the Japanese land forces 
during the war. Of the approximately 330,000 
Japanese troops in the theatre, two thirds were 
killed or died of disease and starvation. 7 
The campa ign in Burma has been 
overshadowed, both contemporaneously and 
subsequently, by 
Nakajimi Ki-43 Hayabusa, codenamed "Oscar.' 
Mitsubishi A6M Reisen, codenamed "Zero. 
o f f e n s i v e 
in tended to 
retake Burma 
and reestablish 
the land supply 
route to China. By 
then the RAF, 
Uni ted States 
Army Air Force 
(USAAF) and the 
Indian Air Force 
were in the 
ascendant, having 
g r a d u a l l y 
achieved air sup-
eriority, provided 
s i g n i f i c a n t 
assistance to the 
ground forces 
throughout their 
bitter hand-to-
hand actions in the dense jungle of the rugged 
Chin Hills. Misawa gave eloquent testimony of 
the Allies dominance in the air when he 
confirmed that he only twice saw Japanese 
aircraft, and that their ground forces were 
constantly harassed by Hurricane fighter-
bombers. Indeed, the Hurricane and Vengeance 
dive bombers were credited with virtually 
liquidating some Japanese positions without 
infantry assistance. 6 As the XlVth ArMy's 
offensive developed, RAF, RCAF and USAAF 
aircraft of Troop Carrier Command transported 
complete Divisions from the Arakan to Imphal 
and to reserve in the Brahmaputa valley. That 
army was then supplied with men, munitions, 
rations and equipment throughout the rest of 
the Allied offensive in what became the largest 
and most remarkable operation by airborne 
forces ever attempted during the Second World 
War. For example, during the two months 
preceding the recapture of Rangoon on 2 May 
1945, the airlift provided the army with over 
2,000 tons of munitions and supplies daily, more 
events in Europe, 
Africa and the 
Pacific. As such, 
the Allied victory 
in Burma 
remains relatively 
unknown in the 
West as well as 
Japan. The 
libraries in Tokyo 
we v i s i t ed en 
passant held few 
h is tor ies of 
Burma or 
accounts of the 
air or g round 
struggles in that 
country. Exhibits 
and references in 
the Japanese 
Nat iona l War 
Museum reflect a similar situation: abundant 
material on the Pacific War, but only a display 
two metres long dealing with Burma which 
omitted mention of the air war in that theatre. It 
was there, however, that the Japanese airmen 
whom we interviewed fought, and unlike most 
their contemporaries, survived. 
The Interviews and Comment 
One of the first questions we asked the group dealt with their flying training. In many 
respects it parallelled our own, but with some 
marked differences. They underwent approx-
imately 150 hours of preliminary flying training 
followed by some 40 hours of operational 
instruction. Flying schools were mostly overseas 
in Taiwan, Korea or Manchuria. As fighter pilots 
they were not considered expert until they had 
500 or more hours. Aerobatics were heavily 
emphasized, a point corroborated by Saburo 
Sakai, Japan's leading ace with 64 victories to 
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The pilots at International House, from left to right, William Rodney, Toshimi Ikezawa, Renichi Misawa, Atholl Sutherland 
Brown, Haruo Matsumoto, Naoyuki Ito, Yoshito Yashuda, and Masura Nagai. 
his credit, in his book, Samuri, a work to which 
the group repeatedly referred and recommended 
to us even though it dealt with the rival Naval 
Air service.8 Rivalry between the Army and Naval 
air services was obviously strong, although the 
army pilots did not overtly admit to it we had 
the impression that they rather resented the 
senior service's air arm apparent favoured 
status. They seemed to feel that their Oscar, 
especially the later marks, was comparable to 
the Navy's vaunted Zero even though it lacked 
the two cannons with which the later was armed. 
Both fighters had long range. With wing tanks 
the Oscars could fly from bases at Heho or 
Meiktila to Imphal and return, a flight of 
approximately six hours, including time over 
target. 
Unfortunately, as previously noted, all our 
respondents flew Oscar fighters. It would have 
been advantageous and illuminating to have 
spoken to other airmen who had flown Army 
Mitsubishi Ki.67 bombers (codenamed Betty) or 
Mitsubishi Ki.462 (codenamed Dinah) unarmed 
reconnaissance aircraft.9 The five pilots praised 
the Oscar for its r e spons iveness , its 
manoeuvrability, and its long range. The latter 
characteristics were particularly appreciated 
during escort duties with formations of Bettys 
attacking airfields when they were forced to 
defend their charges against Allied interceptors. 
All were impressed with the Spitfire Mk.VIII and 
the Mitchell which they found a tough durable 
opponent. One of the group, Ito, who was 
severely wounded during an encounter with a 
Spitfire over Imphal, particularly praised the 
British aircraft for its speed, its supercharged 
Rolls Royce engine, great service ceiling, tight 
turning radius, and its fire power. Compared to 
the Oscars two 12.7 mm (.50 calibre) machine 
guns, the Spits' two 20 mm cannons and four 
machine guns were devastating. None of the 
pilots encountered Thunderbolts; they knew 
little of the Mosquito; and were unaware of the 
Beaufighter or its significant role in Burma. One 
of the pilots, Yasuda, produced a single sheet 
that listed their understanding of the Allied 
Order of Battle, which misidentified 177 
Squadron as a night fighter squadron and did 
not list 211, another Beaufighter squadron. 
When they were not flying escort duties or 
seeking Allied aircraft to challenge, our Japanese 
group stated they were engaged mainly in ground 
support. It was surprising to us they did not 
seriously attempt to interdict the Douglas Dakota 
or Curtiss Commando transports that were the 
XlVth Army's life line. Two of the group stated 
they did engage Dakotas but it was clear from 
the discussion that such interceptions were not 
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a priority and that they had no specific orders 
to concentrate operations against the Allied air 
lift. Their operational briefings, which were 
carried out by the Squadron commander, 
centred mostly on the tactical requirements of 
the day. They did not know the sources of his 
information. Our impression was there were few 
intelligence officers with their squadrons, and 
that because the requisite information was not 
of a high order, the Japanese commanders failed 
to divine the 
s ignif icance of 
General William 
Slim's strategic 
use of air 
transport. 
T h e y 
confirmed their 
units lacked 
v e c t o r i n g 
capability, which 
in turn suggested to us that the Japanese radar 
facilities in Burma were numerically limited and 
technically inferior to Allied equipment. Our 
respondents acknowledged they had little 
information about their radar units, or their 
effectiveness, and what existed they believed was 
largely used in the defence of Rangoon and 
Meiktila. They were unaware of any airborne 
interception radar used by their Air Force in 
Burma and agreed that such equipment 
probably did not exist in their theatre. 1 0 For the 
most part the fighter Sentais depended on map 
reading and familiarity with the terrain for 
navigation, factors which were particularly 
inhibiting during the monsoon. They operated 
mainly from Heho in the Shan Upland, Meiktila 
in the central plains and Mingaladon near 
Rangoon. 1 1 None had operated from the forward 
hard surfaced strips of Magwe or Prome both of 
which had been attacked during 1943 by the 
Beaufighter squadrons which had damaged 
Oscars caught on the ground. 1 2 Although the 
group confirmed taking part in operations over 
Imphal during the monsoon they also stated that 
during periods of bad weather their units 
withdrew to Chiengmai and other bases in 
southern Siam. We considered their comments 
as further confirmation that their Sentais lacked 
radio homing aids, and that instrument flight 
training had been discounted in favour of skills 
considered to be vital in aerial combat. The 
Japanese Sentai were very mobile because 
Supermarine Spitfire 
ground crew were chiefly assigned to bases and 
only specialists travelled with the squadrons. 
When we raised the question of morale, 
particularly in the light of their casualties and 
defeat in Burma, the five fl iers agreed 
unanimously that their spirits never flagged. 
They considered themselves to be an elite force, 
and claimed they were treated as such, given 
super ior b i l le t s , (no ba r r acks ) , had an 
abundance of 
good food unlike 
33rd Army which 
was starving in 
the Chin Hills; 
and to their and 
our amusement, 
e n j o y e d 
unlimited saki. 
As they pointed 
out the Japanese 
Army Air Division 
produced its own saki. They acknowledged the 
frequent resort to what might be called squadron 
pep meetings intended to maintain Squadron 
morale, a very different approach compared with 
the laid back ethos which characterized RAF 
units. 
All acknowledged that their casualties were 
very high. Yasuda noted that only four of his 
classmates who completed flying training with 
him survived the war. Like the Luftwaffe, they 
continued flying until they were killed, or were 
so severely wounded or struck down by tropical 
diseases that they were unfit for further service. 
They envied our system of operational tours and 
the so-called rest periods available to Allied 
a i rcrew. The group also ques t ioned us. 
Matsumato asked what we thought of their 
Kamikaze operations. We said we admired the 
volunteer's courage, but failed to understand the 
philosophy upon which the policy was premised. 
All appeared to agree with that view and seemed 
to feel that the "Divine Wind" was a flawed 
concept and a poor military policy. Interestingly, 
Ito, the oldest of the group, who was badly 
wounded over Imphal, had briefly, in accordance 
with the Bushido tradition, considered diving 
his Oscar into Allied troops or equipment, before 
deciding to try to return to the 64th Sentai's base 
at Meiktila, which he did. After hospitalization 
there and recuperation in Siam he returned to 
the squadron for further active duty. 
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It is perhaps best to provide a summary of 
Yasuda's war as an example to convey the nature 
and extent of our respondents service careers. 
It also provides an inkling as to their qualities. 
Born in 1916, Yasuda enlisted in the Japanese 
Army Air Force in December 1936. After 
comple t ing 
b a s i c 
training he 
was posted 
as a ground 
e q u i p m e n t 
crewman to 
a squadron. 
He served 
brief ly in 
Korea before 
Mitsubishi G4M, codenamed "Betty." 
being moved to various bases in northern China 
during the Sino-Japanese war. In 1938 he joined 
the 64th Sentai where he remained for a year 
until his admission to the Klimagaya Army Air 
Flying School. On completion of flight training 
in July 1940 he rejoined the 64th, by then based 
in Manchuria, and moved with it to Canton, 
China. When the 
J a p a n e s e 
advance into 
Southeast Asia 
began, Yasuda's 
squadron, by 
then equipped 
wi th Oscars 
Mk.Is ,moved to 
successive bases 
in Malaya , Mitsubishi Ki-46, codenamed "Dinah. 
including Kota Bharu, from which he took part 
in the methodical destruction of British air 
power. 
At the beginning of 1942 Yasuda's Sentai 
transferred to Ipoh for the assault upon 
Singapore. There he scored the first of his 10 
victories, knocking down two RAF Hurricanes. 
Service followed in Sumatra and western Java 
before the 64th moved to Chiengmai, Siam, for 
operations against Burma where the Squadron 
encountered Major-General C.L. Chennault's 
Flying Tigers as well as RAF fighters. 1 3 On one 
operation toward the end of April 1942 Yasuda 
force landed behind Allied lines as a result of 
an oil leak and took four days to walk back to 
his own side. On 23 November, flying from 
Mingaladon, he suffered severe facial burns as 
a result of an encounter with B-24 Liberators, 
but parachuted to safety. With the Sentai re-
equipped with Oscar Mark lis in early 1943, the 
unit was assigned to ground attack duties in 
support of the Japanese troops around Akyab. 
By then, as he pointed out, the Allies were 
beginning to achieve air superiority, and the 
i n c r e a s i n g 
loss of 
experienced 
i n s t r u c t o r 
p i l o t s 
together with 
his injuries, 
resulted in 
his return to 
K l i m a g a y a 
f l y i n g 
training school in Japan. He remained there 
until posted to 246 Sentai in May 1945 for the 
defence of Osaka, Kobe, and Kyoto. It was on 14 
August 1945 that Yasuda achieved his final 
victory, his 10th, when he shot down a P-51 
Mustang. In the course of his flying service 
Warrant Officer Yasuda accumulated over 3,500 
hours , an 
a s t o n i s h i n g 
number for a 
fighter pilot. 
Undoubtedly our 
meeting with the 
J a p a n e s e 
veterans was a 
small step 
towards reconciliation, a process which is still 
regarded with suspicion in Japan and in Allied 
countries whose forces served in the Pacific and 
Southeast Asia. Several of our guests had been 
involved in overt acts of reconciliation. As former 
flyers we found our Japanese counterparts to 
be little different from ourselves, and despite the 
language barrier we were soon "hanger flying" 
in a modest and limited fashion. Flyers are flyers, 
and we were drawn together by a common love 
of flying. With great pride and pleasure Ito and 
Yasuda, who also sported an RAF tie, showed 
us photographs of themselves at a combined 
Japanese-British veterans meeting in England 
in 1993 at Biggin Hill, one the Battle of Britain 
front line airfields. Misawa, as President of the 
All Burma Veterans Association, had also been 
involved in reconciliation in Britain. The group, 
like Saburo Sakai, felt it was time to put the 
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past aside. Clearly, our respondents were able 
and brave men who carr ied out their 
assignments under increasingly difficult 
operating conditions. We also shared another 
aspect of wartime service. Airmen, because of 
the nature of their duties, were rarely involved 
in the direct confrontations which characterized 
the clash of armies, and too often led to 
atrocities. 
Denouement 
Tie day after our meeting with the Japanese group Captain Verran suggested that we visit 
the Tokyo War Museum, and arranged for us to 
do so. On our arrival we were ushered into a 
small conference room, sparsely but elegantly 
furnished, where we were given tea and 
questioned by a Shinto Chief Priest and his 
Deputy whilst surrounded by acolytes. The 
Priests asked some surprising questions: where 
and how we were trained; how many flying hours 
had we accumulated; where had we served 
during the war? Throughout the interviews we 
were photographed repeatedly. Afterwards, we 
were led to the Shinto Shrine associated with 
the Museum, taken to a small well where we were 
ritually cleansed, then about turned to face an 
Altar where, as instructed, we commemorated 
the war dead. Afterwards, we concluded that the 
ceremony was in tended as an act of 
reconciliation, but we wondered what use it, the 
proceeding interview and photographs might be 
put. The Museum visit, in essence, symbolically 
concluded our meeting with the Japanese 
veterans, a most interesting and memorable 
occasion. As a light aside we have attributed our 
subsequent well-being during a month in 
Southeast Asia to our having been purified and 
blessed at the Museum's Shinto shrine; but 
perhaps copious beer also helped. 
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Atholl Sutherland Brown, DFC, PhD, served 
with 177 Squadron, RAF, in Burma during 
Second World War and was formerly Chief 
Geologis t for the Province of Brit ish 
Columbia. 
William Rodney, DFC and Bar, MA, PhD, 
served with 78 Squadron, RAF, and was 
formerly Dean of Arts, Royal Roads Military 
College. 
1. The contingent included Toshimi Ikezawa, Naoyuki Ito, 
Haruo Matsumoto, Renichi Misawa, Masaru Nagai and 
Yoshito Yasuda. Their names are given in the western 
style with surnames last. 
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all-up weight of 5.500 pounds, was armed with two 12.7 
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